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forward file

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO DESKBY 280630Z UKDEL NATO
TELNO 155
OF 271843Z MAY 93
AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA, MODUK
INFO IMMEDIATE CABINET OFFICE, ACTOR, THE HAGUE, ANKARA
INFO PRIORITY OTHER NATO POSTS, MOSCOW

SIC EME

MODUK FOR CDS, DUS (P), AUS (C), NEPS, NEDD, GS SEC

YOUR TELNO 281: YUGOSLAVIA: AIR SUPPORT FOR UNPROFOR:
DISCUSSION AT NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (NAC), 28 MAY

SUMMARY

1. LINE TO TAKE AT NAC ON QUESTIONS POSED BY NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES ON IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO OF 22 MAY WASHINGTON AGREEMENT. NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES SHOULD NOW DEVELOP PRELIMINARY PLANS FOR COORDINATING AIR SUPPORT TO UNPROFOR IN SAFE AREAS.
2. INSTRUCTIONS TO WASHINGTON AND PARIS TO PROPOSE THAT NATIONAL RESPONSES TO UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S LETTER NOT NECESSARY NOW.
3. INSTRUCTIONS TO UKMIS NEW YORK TO INFORM UN SECRETARIAT THAT OUR SUBSTANTIVE REPLY WILL PROBABLY BE COORDINATED THROUGH NATO. ✓

DETAIL

4. OUR PRELIMINARY VIEWS ON THE QUESTIONS POSED BY THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES ON THE IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO OF THE 22 MAY WASHINGTON AGREEMENT (PARAGRAPH 5 OF TUR) ARE:

(I) THE SAFE AREAS RESOLUTION IS STILL UNDER DISCUSSION. IT IS NOT YET CLEAR IN WHAT FORM IT WILL EMERGE. BUT RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO ITS IMPLEMENTATION LIES WITH THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT AS REGARDS IMPLEMENTATION ON THE GROUND THE UNSG WOULD LOOK INITIALLY TO ~~NATO AS~~ AN ORGANISATION FOR ASSISTANCE. SUCH INDICATIONS AS WE HAVE SUGGEST THAT THE MAJORITY OF TROOP CONTRIBUTORS TO AN EXPANDED UNPROFOR PRESENCE ARE LIKELY TO BE NON-NATO. NATO'S LOCUS IS THEREFORE LIMITED, NOT LEAST GIVEN THE US'S RELUCTANCE TO PROVIDE GROUND TROOPS.

WE DO NOT ENVISAGE A ROLE FOR NATO IN THE PROVISION OF BORDER MONITORS. WE SEE THIS AS A CIVILIAN TASK.

(II) WE DO HOWEVER WANT NATO TO BE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE PROVISION AND COORDINATION OF AIR SUPPORT, WHICH WE ENVISAGE BEING PROVIDED AS AN EXTENSION OF ARRANGEMENTS TO ENFORCE THE BOSNIA NO FLY ZONE. SO FAR, THE UN HAS ASKED ONLY THE UK, US AND

FRANCE FOR AN INDICATION OF WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE AIR SUPPORT. WE HAVE SAID INFORMALLY THAT WE ARE WILLING. THE UN EVIDENTLY NOW EXPECT AIR SUPPORT TO BE DELIVERED THROUGH NATO (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1863).

(III) THE COUNCIL SHOULD AUTHORISE THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO PREPARE THE NECESSARY OPERATIONAL PLANS FOR AIR SUPPORT, AND TO IDENTIFY FORCE REQUIREMENTS. THE MILITARY COMMITTEE WILL NEED TO TREAD CAREFULLY GIVEN THE CONTROVERSY OVER TURKISH INVOLVEMENT IN THE NFZ, ALTHOUGH THE TERMS OF THE DEAL ALLOWING THE TURKS TO PARTICIPATE IN THAT OPERATION MADE CLEAR THAT THERE WOULD BE NO QUESTION OF TURKISH AIRCRAFT PARTICIPATING IN GROUND TO AIR OPERATIONS.

(IV) AS REGARDS THE ASSUMPTIONS THAT THE PLANNERS SHOULD MAKE, THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH AIR POWER WOULD BE USED SHOULD BE DEFINED IN THE RESOLUTION. THE PRESENT TEXT SAYS THAT AIR POWER MAY BE USED 'TO SUPPORT UNPROFOR IN THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS MANDATE'. WE INTERPRET THIS AS MEANING THAT IT IS FOR UNPROFOR TO ASK FOR AIR SUPPORT, AND TO MAKE THE INITIAL JUDGEMENT ABOUT THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WARRANT IT.

AS TO WHICH TARGETS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED, WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES UNDERTAKE A BROAD RANGE OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING, INCLUDING TARGETS RELEVANT TO THE DEFENCE OF AIRCRAFT TAKING PART IN THE OPERATION. TARGET SELECTION IN ANY PARTICULAR INSTANCE WILL OF COURSE DEPEND ON THE EXACT CIRCUMSTANCES, AND IS LIKELY TO INVOLVE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT RATHER THAN PRE-PLANNED AIR INTERDICTION.

IF THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES FEEL THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION ON WHICH TO BASE PLANS, THEY SHOULD INFORM THE COUNCIL AT AN EARLY STAGE.

(V) IN LINE WITH (III), WE ENVISAGE THAT AIR SUPPORT WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE IN RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FROM UNPROFOR, BUT, AS MENTIONED IN (IV), TARGETS RELEVANT TO THE SAFETY OF SUPPORTING AIRCRAFT SHOULD ALSO BE IDENTIFIED.

(VI) WE WOULD ENVISAGE TASKING ARRANGEMENTS TO BE SIMILAR TO THOSE FOR NO FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT: INVOLVING COM5ATAF.

(VII) NATO CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VANCE/OWEN PEACE PLAN SHOULD CONTINUE. WE SHOULD DO NOTHING TO IMPLY THAT WE REGARD THE PLAN AS UNATTAINABLE. BUT CONSIDERATION OF AIR OPERATIONS SHOULD TAKE PRIORITY.

(VIII) THE NAC HAS NO RIGHT OF OVERSIGHT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IT IS FOR SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS TO DECIDE THE CONTENT OF SCRS.

(IX) WE SEE NO NEED FOR NATO'S EARLIER CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON PREVENTION OF SPILL-OVER TO BE REVIEWED. BUT NO OBJECTION IF OTHERS THINK THAT IT SHOULD BE REOPENED.

5. ON THE POSSIBLE RESPONSE TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S LETTER TO THE US, UK AND FRANCE (STILL NOT SEEN HERE), SINCE THE UN SECRETARIAT APPEAR RELAXED ABOUT RECEIVING A REPLY, IN THE EXPECTATION THAT NATO WILL FOLLOW UP, WE SEE NO NEED TO REPLY NATIONALLY AT THIS STAGE. IN KEEPING WITH OUR EARLIER PREFERENCE TO MINIMISE FORMAL COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SECRETARIES GENERAL, WE WOULD HOPE THAT NATO PLANNING COULD BE PUT IN HAND WITHOUT A FURTHER LETTER FROM WOERNER TO BOUTROS GHALI. THE NATO SECRETARIAT COULD LET IT BE KNOWN IN INFORMAL CONTACTS WITH THEIR UN COUNTERPARTS THAT PLANNING HAD BEGUN. WHEN THE PLANNING WORK

IS COMPLETE, HOWEVER, WE WOULD EXPECT AN EARLY LETTER FROM WOERNER TO THE UNSG.

(FOR WASHINGTON AND PARIS)

6. PLEASE TELL YOUR HOST AUTHORITIES THAT OUR OWN INCLINATION IS TO AVOID A NATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE UN SECRETARIAT AT THIS STAGE, PENDING CONSIDERATION BY NATO: THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR THE THREE TO ACT TOGETHER: AND THAT WE WONDER THEREFORE WHETHER THE US AND FRANCE WOULD ALSO SEE MERIT IN AN EVENTUAL COLLECTIVE NATO RESPONSE (THOUGH YOU MIGHT ADD THAT WE WOULD PROBABLY WISH TO MAKE A NATIONAL NOTIFICATION IN PARALLEL TO THE NATO REPLY).

7. SUCH A RESPONSE MIGHT ALSO HELP TO MITIGATE SOME OF THE SENSITIVITIES OF OTHER ALLIES AND PARTNERS, WHO RESENTED THEIR EXCLUSION FROM THE DECISION-MAKING AT WASHINGTON, AND WHO MIGHT ALSO RESENT AN ASSUMPTION BY INDIVIDUAL ALLIED GOVERNMENTS OF RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH COULD MORE APPROPRIATELY BE UNDERTAKEN IN COMMON.

(FOR UKMIS NEW YORK)

8. PLEASE INFORM THE UN SECRETARIAT THAT WE ENVISAGE THAT OUR SUBSTANTIVE REPLY TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S REQUEST WILL BE MADE THROUGH THE ALLIANCE RESPONSE, ALTHOUGH THAT WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A PARALLEL NATIONAL NOTIFICATION, FOR GOOD ORDER.

(FOR UKDEL NATO)

9. MIFT CONTAINS INSTRUCTIONS ON THE ADRIATIC OPERATION.

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